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Policing of an urban periphery:
The case of Khayelitsha*
ELRENA VAN DER SPUY1 AND ADAM ARMSTRONG
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1 Introduction
A pervasive sense of crisis had long beset the policing of the Apartheid
colony. The transition to democracy, it was thought, would finally
put that crisis to bed.3 The early post-1994 period of reconstruction
envisaged that far-reaching policy reforms and institutional changes
4
would replace the old system, with a community-orientated, democratic
model of policing emphasising accountability and efficiency.5 Over the
past twenty-odd years much effort has gone into the dismantling of
the structures, operational strategies and cultural mind-sets associated
with the Apartheid model of paramilitary policing. A bold emphasis
on collaborative partnerships between communities and police was
intended to replace the spirit of adversarialism which often defined
community-police interactions under Apartheid.6
The process of reform has been uneven.7 Many factors conspired
to make it so. The institutional machine of the police proved resistant
to the revolution in policy.8 Contextual realities interfered with the
proposed liberal reforms. For example, high rates of violent crime after
1995 fuelled disquiet among both rich and poor. Tighter restrictions
Thanks to Jeff Lever, Julie Berg and two anonymous reviewers for their comments
on earlier drafts. We would like to thank Bill Dixon for reminding us of Bowling's
paper on 'good enough' policing: B Bowling 'Fair and Effective Policing Methods:
Towards "Good Enough" Policing' (2007) 8 Journal of Scandinavian Studies in
Criminology and Crime Prevention at 17-32.
1 BA BA (Hons) MA (Stell) PhD (UCT), Professor and Head of Department of Public
Law, UCT.
2 BSocSci (Hons) MSocSci (UCT), Researcher, Centre of Criminology, UCT.
3 J Rauch 'Police Reform and South Africa's Transition' (2000) Paper presented at the
South African Institute Jbr International Afjairs conference.
4 A Faull 'Towards a "New Professionalism" for the South African Police Service'
(2013) 44 South African Review of Sociology 2 at 18-35.
5 AR Gordon 'Democratic Consolidation and Community Policing: Conflicting
Imperative in South Africa' (2001) 11 Policing and Society (2) at 121-150.
6 M Marks 'Shifting gears or slamming on the brakes? An assessment of police
transformation in a South African paramilitary police unit' (2003) 13 Policing and
Society: An International journal of Research and Policy (3) at 235-258.
7 Rauch op cit (n3).
s J Steinberg 'Policing, State Power and the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy:
A New Perspective' (2014) 113 African Aftairs 451 at 173-191.
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on the granting of bail came in 1998. The state's promise in 2000 to
make 'war on crime' tipped the scale against the early idealistic crime
prevention strategies in favour of a tougher rhetoric regarding the role
of the police. Rapid expansion of the police organisation after 2001
led to lower standards of police recruitment and training. A range of
other fateful decisions around specialist units in particular such as
the disbandment of organised crime and anti-corruption structures
and the reorganisation of public order policing, further destabilised
systems and sapped morale. As the rot came to penetrate upper
echelons, rumours about nepotism regarding senior appointments
gained momentum. Before long the initial clarity in policy direction
gave way to fragmentation and contradiction.
9
Those familiar with South African policing literature since 1994
have been alerted to the many fault lines affecting the organisational,
operational and strategic nature of the institution. For example,
research has drawn our attention to the challenges confronting
recruitment; selection and training in the context of a rapid growth
in the size of the police organisation; 10 the damaging effects of the
rapid replacement of white personnel for the sake of 'equity' on overall
levels of competency;11 the persistence of ill-discipline and abuse
of police power despite elaborate systems of external oversight and
internal monitoring;12 a slow meltdown in command and control;13 the
way in which new performance management systems created perverse
incentives to 'cook the books';14 the loss in investigative capacity among
detectives15 and the decline of public order policing competency;16 the
uneven state of police-community relations across the country; and the
S Jensen 'Conflicting Logics of Exceptionality: New Beginnings and the Problem of
Police Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa' (2014) 45 Development and Change
(3) at 458-478; J Steinberg op cit (n8).
10 D Bruce 'New Blood - implications of en masse recruitment for the South Africa
Police Service' (2013) 43 SA Crime Quarterly at 17-28.
11 D Bruce 'New wine from an old cask? The South African Police Service and the process
of transformation', Paper presented at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 9
May 2002, available at http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/policing/newwinefromold.pdf
accessed on 20 August 2014.
12 S Jensen op cit (n9).
13 j Hornberger 'We need a complicit police! Policing then and now' (2014) 48 SA
Crime Quarterly at 17-24.
14 D Bruce 'Measuring Outputs, Neglecting Outcomes' (2011) 38 SA Crime Quarterly
at 3-13.
15 A Altbeker Solving Crime: The State of the SAPS Detective Service (1998) Institute for
Security Studies. Monograph 13.
16 S Tait and M Marks 'You strike a Gathering, You strike a Rock: Current Debates in
the Policing of Public Order in South Africa' (2011) 38 SA Crime Quarterly at 15-22.
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persisting public perceptions 17 of widespread corruption and low levels
of integrity.
1 8
More recently, the events which unfolded at the Marikana platinum
mine outside Rustenburg, where police shot 34 strikers, put the lack of
police professionalism squarely in the public domain. Shortly after the
shootings, the President appointed a body - the Farlam Commission
- to examine the roles of the mining company, the labour unions, the
workers and the security forces and how events led to the escalation
of a labour conflict and to the police use of lethal force. From those
hearings has emerged the image of a police organisation which is
under stress and in considerable disarray. A similar impression has
been created by yet another Commission of Inquiry, the O'Regan/
Pikoli Commission, which has been investigating everyday policing
in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. The simultaneous existence of two
Commissions of Inquiry into critical aspects of policing in one national
jurisdiction is unprecedented.
The deliberations of both Commissions have yielded an
extraordinary amount of data. The material comprises large volumes
of primary documents, in situ inspection reports, specialised research
reports, written submissions by a large number of constituencies, oral
testimonies, hearing transcripts, expert evidence through to video
footage and media reports on the deliberations. Both Commissions
open up the organisational and cultural logic of the police institution
and the wider social milieu within which it operates.
This discussion focuses on the proceedings of the Khayelitsha
Commission of Inquiry. Three questions guide the analysis: What
light does the Commission throw on the challenges confronting the
policing of urban peripheries consisting of large congested townships
in post-Apartheid South Africa? How do protagonists in the urban
drama - the community and the police - articulate those challenges?
And what insights can we draw for what the police could and should
be doing in urban spaces where crime is high, resources constrained
and social capital low?
Here we make an attempt to analyse and interpret the evidence
and compare notes within the frame provided by previous South
African policing studies. In the first instance we briefly describe the
circumstances which led to the establishment of the Commission and
its terms of reference. Second, we outline key features of Khayelitsha
as a social space with high crime rates. The third section describes
two competing narratives which emerged from the Commission - a
17 j Burger 'To Serve and Protect - restoring public confidence in the SAPS' (2011) 36
SA Crime Quarterly at 13-22.
18 A Faull 'When I see them I feel like beating them - Corruption and the South
African Police Service' (2011) 34 SA Crime Quarterly at 33-40.
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community narrative and a police narrative. Each narrative constructs
urban (dis)order and order maintenance in a particular way. We contrast
these constructions before turning to a more detailed consideration of
some key features of the police narrative.
Finally, by way of conclusion we consider the kinds of insights
which the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry provides into a key
question: what kind of policing is possible in a peripheral space such
as Khayelitsha? By way of conclusion the article suggests that more
attention be paid to the concept of 'good enough policing' suited to the
reality of what Bowling calls an 'imperfect world'.19 More substantive a
consideration of the concept is a challenge we leave to others.
2 Commissions of Inquiry into aspects of policing
Commissions of Inquiry are useful mechanisms worldwide by which
current policing deficiencies can be highlighted, and feasible solutions
canvassed.20 From a comparative point of view Commissions vary in
the scope and quality of their investigations. The terms of reference
of Commissions vary from the bold and ambitious to the narrow and
restrained. Commissions can be backward looking or future orientated.
They may conduct their business in an investigatory or inquisitorial
manner.
Commissions of inquiry, as Ashforth argues, are in themselves
worthy objects of scholarly enquiry. 21 Sociological enquiry into public
inquiries into aspects of policing for example has much to contribute to
our understanding of. the political and administrative contexts within
which such inquiries are established and the way in which they evolve
organisationally speaking. Many factors impact on the trajectories
of these forms of public inquiry and on their capacity to influence
institutional policy and practices. Commissions are of symbolic
importance. They provide social spaces for dialogue about issues of
public concern. Commissions construct problems and conceptualise
the solutions to those problems in particular ways. Closer scrutiny of
such 'framings' tells us something about the political squabbles and
ideological contestations of the day.
Modern South Africa has yielded its share of inquiries into various
aspects of criminal justice, prisons and policing. A comparative
19 B Bowling 'Fair and Effective Policing Methods: Toward "Good Enough" Policing'
(2007) 8Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 17-32.
20 Scott Prasser 'A Royal Commissions in Australia: When Should Governments Appoint
Them?' (2006) 65 Australian Journal of Public Administration 5(3) at 28-47.
21 A Ashforth 'Reckoning schemes of Legitimation: On Commissions of Inquiry as
Power/Knowledge Forms' (1990) Journal of Historical Sociology 3 (1) at 1-22.
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assessment of the context, mandates and outcomes of such inquiries
into police and policing however is still to be undertaken.
3 The Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry
Frequent complaints have been made about poor service delivery in
urban townships. In Khayelitsha long-standing complaints about the
inadequacy of police services have become a key focus of community-
based social mobilisation. Over the past eight years or so, the Social
Justice Coalition (SJC) played a critical role in channeling complaints
about safety, security and police services in the area to various
authorities. Failure on the part of provincial and national police and
the Ministry itself to engage with the complaints eventually led to a
direct approach to the office of the Premier in the Province.
The Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry into allegations of police
inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a breakdown in relations between
the community and the police was established by the Premier of
the Western Cape Government by Proclamation on 24 August 2012.
Conceived as an independent Commission of Inquiry, it takes its
legal mandate from s 206(5) of the Constitution of South Africa 1996
and s 66(2)(a) of the Constitution of the Western Cape. The object
of the inquiry, as the Chairperson, Judge O'Regan, was careful to
stress throughout the deliberations, was not to assign liability, guilt or
blame to any person, particularly the SAPS, but rather to investigate
the complaints and provide recommendations for addressing concerns
raised by the public. The Commission consisted of a very small team
and operated within a relatively short agreed-upon time line.
22
The Commission's task was to investigate complaints about police
inefficiency and a breakdown of police and community relations in
three police stations in the wider Khayelitsha area. Excluded from its
mandate was an examination of social or developmental issues that
affect residents of Khayelitsha as well as any broader investigation
into other components of the criminal justice system. Furthermore,
law enforcement agencies other than the South African Police Service
(such as the Metro Police) were also excluded from its remit. In the
initial phase, this exclusion led to some concern that the SAPS was
being set up as a convenient 'scapegoat' for wider ills. In the event such
concerns made way for a much more cooperative spirit of engagement
between the SAPS and the Commission than the original political
animosities suggested would be the case.
22 The five members of the Commission: Commissioners: Justice Catherine O'Regan
(Chairperson); Advocate Vusumzi Pikoli. Evidence Leaders: Advocate Nazreen
Bawa, Advocate Thembalihle Sidaki. Secretary: Amanda Dissel.
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Using inspection visits and a number of audit reports as a point of
departure, the Commission first orientated itself to the structure and
provision of policing nationally, provincially, and within the greater
Khayelitsha area. The tone of the debate was very much set by the
Task Team Report (known colloquially as the Tshabalala Report)23 and
the Schooling and Leamy Report.24 A cadre of senior police officers
drawn from Head office in Pretoria through to Provincial management,
as well as commanding officers attached to special units, clusters
and stations made submissions and were cross-examined. From the
submissions, public testimonies and cross-examinations, emerged the
finer details of administrative systems in operation, and of the routine
nature of operational policing in this urban locality. The discussions
engaged with the external and internal exigencies which impact on
the business of policing and the kind of compromises forged in the
face of difficulties. Above all the hearings yielded information as to
how senior occupational incumbents envisage their job and go about
doing it in this kind of environment.
4 The final report
On 25 August 2014 the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry presented
its report of 580 pages to the relevant authorities. 25 The concluding
chapter of the report contains the recommendations organised under
twenty headings. The introduction to this section reaffirms the
constitutional principles upon which the political contract between
the democratic South African state and its people are based. From this
contract flows the imperative for improving policing services provided
by the state so as to improve access to justice and security amongst the
urban poor. The environmental difficulties notwithstanding informal
settlements, the report reiterates, have to be policed. At present the
police system itself exhibits serious deficiencies. The report outlines
many reasons for the inefficiencies and a significant level of distrust
and a breakdown of relations. However, the breakdown of relations
however is not described as 'irretrievable or irreparable'. Some of the
key recommendations include: the adoption of a new partnership
informed by a social contract between the police and the community;
23 L Tshabalala 'Task Team Report on the Complaint Regarding Alleged Inefficiency
and a Breakdown in Police-Community Relations in Khayelitsha, Cape Town'
evidence submitted to the Khayelitsha Commission Bundle 1(3) AL8
24 G Schooling & M Leamy 'Report Prepared by G Schooling and M Leamy', no date,
evidence submitted to the Khayelitsha Commission Report I Bundle 9 (1.1).
25 Khayelitsha Commission 'Towards a Safer Khayelitsha' the Report of the Commission
of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency and a Breakdown in Relations
between SAPS and the Community in Khayelitsha, August 2014.
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the adoption of a 'procedural justice model of policing' and a review
of two critical management tools: the human resource allocations
guide and the performance management chart so as to engage with
the inequities in resources as a matter of urgency. Furthermore various
task teams are proposed to address the state of the detective service
and systems of oversight and discipline in particular. Various practical
recommendations are formulated to attend to specific crime challenges
relating to youth gangs, domestic violence, and vengeance killings.
Concerted effort is required, so reiterates the Commission, if the many
obstacles which confront the police and the community of Khayelitsha
are to be negotiated. Upon that negotiation depends the realisation
of the constitutional vision of equitable access to safety of all South
African citizens - including the poor.
5 Khayelitsha as a social space and crime locality
In the sprawling township of Khayelitsha east of Cape Town, population
density, socio-economic underdevelopment, and high rates of
unemployment affect a youthful population. Population estimates for the
area vary considerably but even at the lower end of the guestimates,
some 370 000 to 426 000 people are squashed into an area of six
26square kilometers. The level of social exclusion from public services
is a contested issue. Over the past decade or two the reach of the state
into the townships has improved considerably. Township residents have
increasing access to all kinds of public services such as schooling, running
water, electricity and refuse collection. Access to housing has improved
with two thirds of the population of Khayelitsha in formal housing.
Popular images of Khayelitsha often fail to take account of developmental
improvements spearheaded by the state. But notwithstanding such
improvements life in Khayelitsha remains 'wretched'.27
Submissions from complainant organisations and research experts
emphasised that residents of Khayelitsha are exposed to high levels of
interpersonal violence. Crime data indicate that Khayelitsha constitutes
a crime 'hotspot' with high rates of murder, assault, robbery and sexual
assault. Recently youth gangs have been operative in the area. Violence
against foreigners has been a recurring issue. Vengeance violence
- sporadic, dramatic, and hot - has taken a large toll. Generally the
police have not been able to develop effective strategies to anticipate
where these areas of criminal violence will be most acute. When the
three police precincts, Khayelitsha Site B (usually referred to simply
26 C Simkins, 'A Socio-Economic Profile of Khayelitsha' (2014) Report for the
Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a
Breakdown in Relations between the Community and the Police in Khayelitsha at 10.
27 C Simkins op cit (n 26) at 11.
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as 'Khayelitsha'), Harare and Lingelethu-West are considered together,
greater Khayelitsha features as a top-five nationally for all of the major
violent interpersonal crimes. The problems in Khayelitsha around liquor
outlets and access to drugs and firearms exacerbate an already difficult
crime situation. High rates of inter-personal and criminal violence mean
that the youth of Khayelitsha, as Kaminer puts it, are 'incubated in
violence' from which stem 'very particular psychological impacts' 28 The
fear of crime is pervasive in Khayelitsha as crime data tabled at the
Commission illustrated.
High levels of fear combined with low levels of trust in the police are
confirmed by a number of crime victim surveys. The daily experience
of unsafe streets was forcefully illustrated in the words of a community
witness, Sifiso Zitwana, is his testimony:
'When I'm saying that another person of another race will not understand
our pain of someone living in a shack, even living in a shack, just living in a
shack is not safe.. .without living there they will not know what it feels like.
Living in an informal settlement area, a place without lights, which is dark
at night where sometimes you have to go and relieve yourself in the bushes.
Sometimes you have to go and get water from a different street which is not
your street. That is also not safe. Also, growing up in my community seeing
people die or people getting assaulted until they die while you are young,
those are the issues I'm talking about.
29
6 Two competing narratives: community versus police
Two narratives run through the thousands of pages of evidence
collated by the Commission - a community narrative and a police
narrative. Some dexterity is required to dissect these narratives. Each
camp makes submissions according to a pre-conceived political logic.
It is the job of the complainant organisations to state the case for
community residents. It is the task of those representing the police
to turn the mirror the other way. On both sides the tendency is to
dramatise the case. Looking beyond the surface level of presentations
there is more ambiguity to be found than a stark juxtaposition of
the cases would suggest. For the sake of an initial scan, we capture
defining features of the two competing narratives before turning to a
consideration of some key elements of the police's narrative.
28 D Kaminer 'Oral Submission to the Khayelitsha Commission' 30 January 2014 at 801.
29 S Zitwana 'Oral Submission to the Khayelitsha Commission' 7 February 2014 at
2034.
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6.1 The community narrative
The complainant organisations paint a gloomy picture of willful state
neglect, and the daily drudging experiences of the poor - caught in
the trap of economic and social exclusion from jobs and everyday
physical insecurity, and exposed frequently to intra-communal violence.
The evidence submitted to the Premier of the Western Cape, and to
the Commission, is built around individual cases of brutal criminal
victimisation and state neglect. These are hyper-personal stories of
injury and trauma. These narratives confront the reader in emotive and
chilling terms.
The individual cases of Lorna Mlofana, Nandipha Mkeke and
Zoliswa Nkonyana and five others, constitute crucial parts of the NGO
complainants' case against the police. All of these are discussed in
detail in Zackie Achmat's oral testimony to the Commission. Each case
contains similar elements: There is a brutal and tragic crime which
produces a victim. The effects of primary victimisation inflicted by the
criminal act are magnified by forms of secondary victimisation, ie state
neglect. Police ineptitude, inefficiency or outright refusal to provide
services combined with endless delays in court proceedings and court
sentencing make for state neglect. From these testimonies emerged
the cauldron of an unsocial space, where violent crime impinges with
regularity on inhabitants and their relatives. The police are described
as incompetent, neglectful and abusive. Only in passing - rather sotto
voce - is it acknowledged that pockets of good police do exist and that
the environment is a harsh one for police too.
The complaints are framed around 'justice' and 'access to justice' as
articulated in the South African constitution. The NGO narrative draws
on a constitutional rhetoric, the bill of human rights and 'justice for all'.
There is a fundamental disrespect evidenced by the City and by the
SAPS when people are victimised and their cases are not followed up.
Throughout, the nature of the community is described in rather flat
and homogeneous terms. There is little attempt to engage with the
inter-personal nature of violent crime, ie the fact that it is residents of
Khayelitsha who do violence to one-another. Vigilantism is often framed
as the logical next step, once it is accepted that residents of Khayelitsha
are unhappy with the level of policing that they are receiving.
'I haven't reported any incidents of crime because people I know have
opened a case and nothing has happened. The police do not investigate
cases and when they do arrest someone they release them without pursuing
cases against them. I see mobs beating people approximately twice a month.
I think they should be beaten because they deserve it. I feel this way because
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there is no other way that criminals are punished for their wrongdoing in
Khayelitsha.'
30
The lack of service delivery amongst the police is seen at times in
the wider context. There is acknowledgement that poor policing
is a variation on a much wider theme of state neglect and urban
underdevelopment. But despite this wider grasp of the neglect of the
poor in the urban periphery it is the police who are blamed for the
experience of humiliation, crime and helplessness that the community
experiences. Considered inept and disinterested, rude and abusive in
its routine interaction with citizens and victims of crime, the police
are lambasted for their failure to deliver procedural justice and by
implication social justice.
6.2 The police narrative
The police organisation in turn embellishes its case. The text is shaped
by an occupational logic which emphasises external exigencies and
internal resource constraints while underplaying neglect on the part
of the police organisation. Individual submissions from station and
cluster commanders, heads of various specialist divisions, provincial
management and head office, follow an organisational logic.
This narrative tilts the mirror in another way. It reveals a community
characterised by endemic disorder and a physical terrain difficult to
negotiate. It has an 'impossible' mandate.31 In the locality of the urban
ghetto life is hard, brutish and often very short. The population is a
transient one. There is in-migration from the rural hinterland and out-
migration amongst those in search of more hospitable spaces. Spatial
transience makes for looseness of networks, and thinness in sociality.
Large volumes of intra-community violence and predatory forms of
criminality nibble away bit by bit at sociality. This volatile social space
spews out the daily staple of social problems and criminal incidents.
It is the police who confront the community's frustrations - with
poverty, joblessness and a lack of safety and security. It is they who
bear the brunt of that frustration. In a place of dire need they are
the thin blue line, the 'vanguard' of an otherwise distant state.
32
30 Ndifuna Ukwazi 'Our Evidence for the Commission' January 2014 at 8.
31 A concept used in the South African Police Service Opening Statement, 23 January
2014 point 4.
32 In his submissions to the Commission Jeremy Seekings took issue with this
projection on the part of the police, portraying themselves as the vanguard of
the largely absent state. J Seekings 'Economy, society and municipal services in
Khayelitsha' (2013), Report Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations
of Police Inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a Breakdown in Relations between the
Community and the Police in Khayelitsha.
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They are often expected to be omnipotent. They feel that they are
considered the all-purpose mopping-up agency accessible around the
clock. The community service centres, they report, field all kinds of
calls from people in need. They are not only cops, but also expected
to be 'priests, counsellors and social workers'.3 3 But equally so their
presence in other spaces is resented and resisted. The police narrative
emphasises that the community is fickle in its attitude to the police.
The police are blamed for things for which they are not responsible -
for granting bail and/or parole, for lenient sentences, for the slowness
at which the wheels of justice turn. The community's relationship to
the police is contradictory - people both rely on the police and resist
often the interventions made by the police.
According to the constitutional script the police are responsible
for order maintenance, the detection, investigation and prevention of
crime. Even in the most affluent and peaceful of spaces this mandate
is a daunting one. Much more so in an urban locality characterised by
want and despair. But in this imperfect world they cannot be expected
to be perfect, so the argument goes. How could they be? They too are
human - like all of us. An error is a human thing. The police narrative
concedes that there are some gaps, some limitations some of the time
in how policing services are provided. Efficiency is a relative kind of
thing. Police-community relations are not static. They vary across time,
space and issues involved. But despite such debilitating circumstances
and internal shortcomings, on the whole, much of the time, committed
personnel are trying their level best to respond to difficult situations.
So argue the police through various police personae on a stage
overseen by the Commissioners.
7 Thematic areas emerging from police narratives
Beyond the surface appearance of a coherent singular narrative there
lies more diversity and at times more incoherence. It is a diversity which
is constitutive of a division between national and provincial officials,
the managerial elite and those closer to the streets, of key components
and pockets of specialisation within the organisation. In the discussion
below we go in search of that complexity, contradictory as it may
be. We choose to focus on seven themes: Context is all important;
Systemic not police failures; The resource curse and inequities; We
are aware of the problems; Administrative versus operational policing;
The police are scared too; It's lonely out there.
33 N Arendse 'Opening statement on Behalf of SAPS' read out at the Khayelitsha
Commission 23 January 2014 at 45.
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7.1 Context-specific realities: a rough environment and an
impossible mandate
One key feature of the police narrative relates to an emphatic appeal
to contextual realities operative in Khayelitsha. Time and again there
was reference to the fact that local realities place limitations on the
performance of the police. The operational terrain is described as
rough and at times impenetrable. There is the sheer volume of cases
of violent crime, domestic disputes and petty crime. Streets have
no names, houses have no numbers, and in the absence of proper
streets motorised patrols are often not feasible. In this kind of terrain
conventional policing is difficult. This insistence on locality, or context,
both physical and social, is captured as follows:
'The police terrain is characterised by homelessness, lack of proper housing,
underhousing, overcrowded informal settlement, lack of recreational
facilities, very serious high levels of unemployment and hopelessness
generally. Patrols on foot are difficult - dangerous - potentially the police
are policing a community that is angry about poor service delivery including
poor sanitation, the absence of decent living conditions. So when we judge
the competence we need to take into account this particular terrain.'
34
Consider the description of Brigadier Zithulele Dladla, the person
responsible for the three police stations in Khayelitsha, when he
reflected on the qualitative and quantitative differences between
policing the relatively affluent suburb of Wynberg and Khayelitsha:
'Ay, when I arrived at Khayelitsha, I was shocked. Because yes, I had worked
at the stations which are like Mfuleni, Kraaifontein - but I didn't expect
what I saw.... In Wynberg we had 3 murders a year. In Khayelitsha by Friday
morning 12.30 we already had one murder and by the end of the weekend
three more. I said Ay. But the members said, no Brigadier, it is much better
now.'
35
The idiosyncrasies of local context to which police allude include
not only the physical terrain they confront but also the social spaces
they have to negotiate. Many of those who testified in front of the
Commission spoke about the police having to confront hostile
collectivities of people who converge in space. Groups confront the
police as they attempt to close illegal liquor outlets; respond to mob
attacks on alleged wrongdoers or secure crime scenes. Such contexts
are volatile and not suited to 'conventional' or 'normal' policing
methods.
Routine operations aimed at closing illegal shebeens have to contend
with large number of irate and inebriated customers. Roaming unruly
34 N Arendse op cit (n33) at 44.
35 Z Dladla 'Oral Testimony to the Khayelitsha Commission' 17 February 2014 at 3337.
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'mobs' resulted in crime scenes that are often not secured. In his
testimony Brigadier Dladla was adamant: the spectacle of crime draws
crowds to the scene. Outnumbered and outwitted the police find it
difficult to exert control over the physical environment in which the
crime occurred. And in such contexts it is the double edged role of
the police - perceived as an instrument of coercion in the very act of
trying to intervene in pursuit of order maintenance - of which we are
reminded here.
'Conducting policing in a sea of poverty and hopelessness is most difficult.
SAPS ... deals with service delivery crimes which has the effect of creating
a platform for resentment of the police. People who live in the squalid
conditions of Khayelitsha see the police as an instrument of repression when
they are arrested for social delivery related crimes.'
36
Regarding the difficulties of raiding illegal shebeens Dladla had the
following to say:
'On a Saturday night if you go to a shebeen that has about 60 to 100 people,
you can't do it with a vehicle and two members, you have to have enough
people to be able to close that shebeen... .with four members, they're going
to walk all over you, the people there. So it's better to have numbers so that
you prevent injuries to people. People, when they realise that there's few
police officials, they say, we can take a chance here, and we end up using
live ammunition which is not necessary.'
37
Major General David Molo, the head of detectives for Khayelitsha,
elaborated in his testimony on the difficulty of crime scene management
in informal neighbourhoods:
'The only problem Commissioner that we have is the number of onlookers at
the scene, people that are coming to the scene they want to come close and
that is why it also affects our deployment because people come in numbers
to the scene and you will need three or four vans to have at least eight
people to try and move people away from the scene. There are people who
are drunk who will just run into the scene like you see maybe in a cricket
match.
,38
7.2 It's a system-wide failure not a police failure
Throughout the Commission's deliberations much was made of the
failure of the police as the gatekeeper to the wider criminal justice
system to fulfil its responsibilities relating to the detection and the
investigation of crime so that access to justice could follow. Sloppiness
in investigation, the faulty maintenance of dockets and lack of
36 z Dladla Statement to the Commission of Inquiry at 27 point 83.
37 Z Dladla op cit (n35) at 3518.
38 D Molo 'Oral Testimony to the Khayelitsha Commission' 27 March 2014.
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coordination with the courts, it was argued, sabotaged any prospects
for justice to be delivered. Ms Harmse, the Senior Public Prosecutor
at the Khayelitsha Magistrate Court, listed the woes besetting police
handling of dockets, the summoning of witnesses and the presentation
of evidence. The police in their response turned the tables - by
placing the blame at the door of the court system. Backlogs beset the
National Prosecution Service. It too, in the face of resource constraints,
case overload, staff demoralisation, and uneven legal skills, resorts
to a quota system which prioritise some cases over others. Police
testimony spoke about efforts on their part to put mechanisms in place
to ensure better quality dockets, enhance docket flow and improve
communication between the police and the courts. The blame for the
postponement of cases could not simply be laid at the door of the
police. As Brigadier Aaron Mlenga put it:
'The police have no control over courts where prosecutions are low, accused
are released (on bail) and sentences are lenient.'
39
7.3 The resource curse: 'Robbing Peter to pay Paul'
A key concern of the police narrative involved the issue of resources.
This issue was often deliberated through the lens of case overload
within the detective service. At times it appeared as if the discussion
exclusively focused on the quantity of resources and the logic of its
distribution across space and time. It soon became clear that the legacy
of long standing inequities in the distribution of public resources
across a racialised South Africa has not disappeared despite concerted
efforts to redistribute resources in a more equitable way. It is in this
context that the concept of a 'strafstasie' (punishment station) reared its
head and then disappeared from view. Under Apartheid and amongst
police, stations in black townships were often regarded as punishment
stations. These were places characterised by bad infrastructure, high
workloads and low levels of resources, places - like Khayelitsha -
which are situated at the bottom of a police system where recalcitrant
members of the organisation served time.
As Mr Schooling explained:
'... in early dates (i.e. before 1994) when they wanted to deal with you and
not deal with your departmentally you would be sent to one of the stations
that is not so nice to work at so it is a culture that has come for a very, very,
very long time in the police ... ,40
39 A Mlenga 'Statement to the Khayelitsha Commission' at 5 point 12.
40 G Schooling 'Oral Testimony to the Khayelitsha Commission' 10 February 2014 at
2350.
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The conversation on resources also recognised that the problem was
not so much the quantity of resources but rather the quality of and
management by commanding officers. What this meant was a shift
in the conversation away from a simple lament about the fact that
there are not enough police officers in Khayelitsha to effectively police
Khayelitsha to an acknowledgement that resources are not distributed
appropriately, to where they are needed most:
'We are quick to say our detectives are not working, our detectives are
working but they are over loaded. You know in the movies.. .you see a team
ascending to a crime scene, attending to a docket but here you have a team
of dockets ascending on a detective.
' 
41
The Commission engaged at length with resource allocation. Brigadier
Rabie - a senior officer attached to the Human Resource Division at
Head Quarters - described in fine detail the regulatory framework
within which resources are allocated. Much of his testimony focussed on
a discussion of the Theoretical Human Resource Requirement (THRR)
and the Resource Allocation Guide (RAG) in terms of which the number
of posts and other resources at station levels are determined in line with
budgetary allocations and the medium-term expenditure framework.
The RAG was held up as key to the application of a 'uniform approach'
to the distribution of human and other resources across nine provinces
and 1 137 stations. Rabie reiterated that the RAG and the THRR were
theoretical templates which incorporated a large number of variables
(population size, infrastructural development, crime rates and many
more) relevant to the calculation of police resources. The data utilised
in the calculation are fed upwards by station commanders. Given the
tendency to inflate needs at station level the integrity of the data has to
be monitored by Organisational Development practitioners. Built into
the calculation was some 'contingency allowance' to allow for police
to attend a workshop or take a lunch break and so on. After all SAPS
'was not a factory' which 'produces jam' on a mechanised conveyer
belt. On the contrary, as a complex organisation made up of thousands
of people who fulfil a range of tasks in very diverse settings, SAPS
required 'flexible management'.
Current resource constraints however meant that only two thirds of
the theoretically allocated posts were funded. Within this context, the
room for manoeuvre to divert resources to needy stations is limited.
There is some space for discretion, to be exercised by the Provincial
Commissioner for a redeployment of admittedly limited resources.
But as Brigadier Rabie pointed out, exercising this discretion would
amount to 'rob(bing) Peter to pay Paul'. Backlog of cases, it transpired,
was not a factor considered in the allocation of resources. One could
41 Z Dladla op cit (n 35) at 3506.
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not, said Brigadier Rabie, create a permanent capacity to deal with
backlogs. The best one could do was to assemble a 'cold case squad'
which would focus its attention on old cases but this again was only
feasible in the short term unless one was prepared to keep on robbing
Peter to pay Paul over an extended period.
All of this effort - stretched over almost a decade - to develop
formulae was aimed at developing uniform standards which could
be applied in a non-partisan way across the police estate. Brigadier
Rabie stated: 'It took us 10 to 15 years to get where we are now'.
4 2
The object of this exercise, as Rabie emphasised, was to live up to the
constitutional principle that policing is equally provided across South
Africa. But an examination of allocations across stations however,
suggested otherwise. In Claremont the ratio of police to population
was 1 to 130, in Lingelethu West it was 1 to 275. This discrepancy had
to be explained. Either the data utilised were faulty, or the theoretical
model itself was misguided. If for Brigadier Rabie the RAG was a
major administrative accomplishment, the Commission had its doubts.
Described by Commissioner O'Regan as an extremely sophisticated
system she continued to raise questions relating to the integrity of
the data utilised in the formula as well as the weighting of variables
(crime rates in particular) in the equation. Another important question
to which there was no clear answer focused on the allocation of
resources between components of the police (visible policing versus
detective service). As Commissioner O'Regan put it:
'It seems to me that an enormous amount of thought and care is put into the
system that you have described this morning but is seems entirely unconnected
or disconnected to what the experience is on the ground in Khayelitsha...
43
Commissioner O'Regan also stated:
'You see, this is a management tool that you're working with, if the
management tool is so far detached from the experiences on the ground I
kind of wonder how much use it is as a management tool.'
4 4
The impact of resources on police effectiveness became a critical focus
of the woes confronting the detective service. Twenty years of reform
- owing to a variety of unfortunate decisions - have seen a dramatic
decline in the capacity of the detective division. Police researchers
such as Antony Altbeker have long bemoaned the impact of the
declining ability of the detective division to make headway against
42 L Rabie 'Oral Testimony to the Khayelitsha Commission' 25 March 2014 at 5380.
43 K O'Regan 'Questions put to Brigadier Leon Rabie during his Testimony to the
Khayelitsha Commission' 25 March 2014 at 5345.
44 K O'Regan op cit (n43) at 5348.
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serious crime. 45 Official recognition of the extent of the problem had
only been forthcoming in the last few years.
Recently some efforts have been forthcoming to offset the damages
and re-invest in training and resourcing anew. 2013, for example, was
earmarked as the Year of the Detective. Khayelitsha presents a worst
case scenario of the conditions under which detectives have to operate.
Case overload (on a really huge scale) has combined with considerable
skill deficits and resource constraints in a toxic way. Under such
conditions detectives are forced to develop coping strategies. Overall
the situation saps morale and exposes detectives to high levels of
occupational stress. In this kind of situation, as a coping strategy,
they pick their battles, prioritise certain cases over others and seek
opportunities to close files.
Lt Col Swart, Detective Commander of Lingelethu West acknowledged
that the detective component confronted a wide range of challenges.
Perhaps in an attempt to be pragmatic he warned that 'ideal detectives
you only get in movies'. 46 Later on still he acknowledged that he had
no knowledge of computers but that this did not mean that he could
not do his job. After all 'detectives' - and not computers - 'solve crime
cases'.
47
Finally, the issue of quality rather than the quantity of human
resources was broached in many of the conversations on resources.
The decline in the quality of recruits was particularly central in
Mulder Van Eyk's damning report on the state of basic training48 it
became more than clear that SAPS have not been able to recruit nor
train the kind of staff required to operate in a challenging policing
environment. Recruits, he reported, apply to the police as a last rather
than first resort. Recruits have low levels of literacy and numeracy and
social problems abound amongst a cadre which had families to care
for. Trainers he reported are ill suited to their jobs. The emphasis of
training is not on the development of skills.49 Standards of assessment
are problematic and field training is not properly supervised. It is
against this kind of background that the decision to deploy young
recruits just out of training as detectives in Khayelitsha needs to be
appreciated.50
45 A Altbeker op cit (nl5).
46 B Swart 'Oral Testimony to the Khayelitsha Commission' 17 February 2014 at 3444.
47 B Swart op cit (n46) at 3435.
48 M Van Eyk 'Affidavit submitted to the Khayelitsha Commission' 16 February 2014.
49 M Van Eyk op cit (n 48).
50 M Van Eyk 'Oral Submission to the Khayelitsha Commission' 16 February 2014.
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7.4 We are aware of the problems, we have been working
toward solutions
Issues of resource constraints and wider resource inequalities loomed
large in the Commission. Cross-examination of the theoretical resource
requirements, the range of factors which are considered to decide
staffing allocations were all aimed at getting to grips with why the
'Apartheid style' inequities were still with us. What the Commission's
discussions revealed were the many efforts which have been made to
channel resources into needy areas. These special projects have all
aimed at optimising resource allocation and resource utilisation - the
very stuff which the Commission of Inquiry was taking stock of. We
turn to a brief summary of such efforts which have been pursued over
the last ten years.
There have been various Special Projects which have been adopted
and implemented by the Police Service, both at the Provincial and
National levels. The three police stations in Khayelitsha have featured
in many of them. In 2001 Khayelitsha Site B was a station identified by
then President Thabo Mbeki as a priority station to which resources
had to be channeled. 51 Evidence suggests that there was little
follow-up on the designation of Presidential Stations. According to a
report submitted to the Presidency in 2002, in 11 of the 16 Presidential
Stations, the conditions had worsened since being designated, and that
resourcing was worse 2 years later.
52
Projects 23, 31 and 6, the three provincially-implemented projects,
all focus on resource allocation and addressing violent crime in the
Western Cape. Stations identified for each subsequent project were
chosen based on their contribution to crime within the Province. In
2012, 23 police stations were identified as worst performers, based
on their contribution to the provincial crime statitics. These were the
target of Project 23. In 2013 an additional 8 stations were added and
Project 23 became Project 31.
In 2014 Project 31 was changed to Project 6. Project 6 continued in the
same manner; however it involved senior provincial officers providing
management and operational input into the running of stations. As
51 Thabo Mbeki, then President, identified 16 police stations from across the country.
These 16 were designated Presidential Stations and were to receive priority in
terms of resourcing and support. President Mbeki stated that 'presidential police
stations that would, as a priority, receive adequate resources and substantial
improvements'. SAPA 'DA: SAPS Allowed to Haemorrhage' News 24, 11 November
2002, available at http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/DA-SAPS-allowed-
to-haemorrhage-20021111, accessed on 20 August 2014.
52 H W Hartley 'South Africa: Deterioration of Police Stations Designated by Mbeki
being Probed' Business Day, 12 November 2002, available at: http:/allafrica.com
stories/200211120099.html, accessed on 20 August 2014.
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part of Project 6, R3 Million was authorised as an additional budget
for overtime for detectives at six stations, the intention being to create
additional resources to address the backlog of cases.
The People Orientated Sustainable Strategy (POSS) was an initiative
which dated back to 2003. A key part of the POSS strategy was making
100% human material resources available at Priority Stations (of which
Khayelitsha was one). Under POSS, overtime budgets and training
budgets were also used to make additional resources available at
Priority Stations, and to increase the skill of members available in
those areas. The POSS strategy was revised in 2011/2012, and became
the Optimal Performance Utilisation Strategy (OPUS).
From General Arno Lamoer's testimony it was clear that each of the
project initiatives were accompanied by management input of senior
officers into the operational concerns of the stations:
'[We] look at the human resource capacity, look at the skills levels of
the people there, look at the backlogs of investigations; each and every
component [of the station comes] under the guidance of the deputy
provincial commissioners ... For example, under General Burger, the head
of HR management, will come and look at leave audit, look at absenteeism,
look at EHW and so forth, employment health and wellness. Under finance,
the component head there will come and look at the spending of the budget,
what the budget look like, is there sufficient budget and so on.. .So we
believe that by addressing all these things the services [to the community]
can be improved.'
5 3
The THRR and RAG are nationally contrived processes that even the
Provincial Commissioner is unable to change. General Lamoer stated in
his testimony that he agreed that 'the RAG is fundamentally irrational'.
54
Despite a bit of room to shift resources around at the provincial level
as someone else commented the Provincial Commissioner was 'gagged
by the RAG'.55 The special projects constitute Provincial efforts to
redress inaccuracies created and handed down from the National
Office. These various special projects can be understood as attempts,
further downstream and in limited ways, to ameliorate the ineffective
and inaccurate resource allocation processes driven centrally by the
National SAPS office in Pretoria. But the impact of such efforts has
been uncertain.
53 A Lamoer 'Oral Testimony to the Khayelitsha Commission' 1 April 2014 at 6544.
54 A Lamoer op cit (n53) at 6605.
55 Z Dladla op cit (n35) at 3508.
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7.5 'Inspected to death'? Administrative versus operational
policing
Part and parcel of the transition towards a democratic model of policing
has been an emphasis on accountability and oversight. The elaborate
architecture of accountability and oversight adopted in South Africa
has been held up as an enviable example to other police institutions
on the continent. From the mid-2000s onwards however it has become
evident that this elaborate system has not been functioning anywhere
near to optimal effect. 56
A large portion of the Commission's deliberations focused on
issues of command and control more broadly and the functionality
of internal audit systems more specifically. These conversations were
informed by the Schooling and Leamy Report 57 and the Tshabalala
Task Team Report.58 Both documented many instances of inadequate
record keeping at station levels and the fact that the investigation of
complaints against the police left much to be desired.
Issues of command and control and the establishment of compliance
with standing orders and other procedural rules featured in many of
the cross-examinations. A pivotal piece of evidence in this regard was
that by Sharon Jephta, Deputy Provincial Commissioner in charge
of Operations, and former Head of the Provincial Inspectorate.
59
Some broad observations which emerge from the discussion include
the following: the sheer weight of laws, policies, standing orders,
instructions, directives and procedures which define police work; the
elaborate and labour intensive system of internal inspections currently
in existence; the amount of effort which has been invested in the
design of templates which seek to record compliance at station level;
the regularity with which inspections are conducted across regions,
clusters and police stations and the extent to which many deficiencies
are recorded. Despite the effort invested in inspection it also became
clear that the system struggles to respond to deficiencies in a way
which makes for more compliance.
Throughout this conversation one was reminded of the extent to
which recording and record keeping define the job of policing in
modern bureaucracies. There are standing orders, instructions and
procedures to be adhered to. There is a paper maze involved in
56 D Bruce 'Unfinished Business - The Architecture of Police Accountability in South
Africa' (2011) APCOF 2 Policy Brief at 1-16, available at http://www.apcoJorgfiles1
APCOF%2OBrief%202%2OUnihished%2OBusiness%20WEB.pdf accessed on 20
August 2014.
57 G Schooling & M Leamy op cit (n24).
58 L Tshabalala op cit (n 23).
59 S Jephta 'Oral Testimony to the Khayelitsha Commission' 31 March 2014.
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recording actions taken at every step. There are records to complete at
regular intervals of the day, week and month.
The Commission evidence gave widespread recognition of the
degree to which standing orders and operational guidelines fine-tune
the job of policing in any specific locality. Audits and inspections
form part of an elaborate approach to administration. Through her
testimony General Jephta allowed us to appreciate the modernist and
administrative logic at work at national head office. 60 The system of
surveillance is designed to steer a large and complex police machine
according to a set of common rules which in itself is driven by
some central purpose. She outlined a complex set of oversight and
management practices that are used to manage officers and resources
and assess performance. 61 With predictable regularity inspection
teams are dispatched to stations, clusters and regions across the
province. Focusing on 'frontline services' the inspection teams
dutifully register non-compliance. For this purpose it utilises elaborate
checklists. Inspection reports are fed upwards and then sideways to
line managers who bear the responsibility for intervening.
As General Sharon Jephta put it:
'The purpose of the Inspection is to look at compliance, Commissioner.
The purpose of the Inspectorate is not to look at efficiency; it looks at
compliance. 62 The inspectorate's responsibility is to inspect and to then
hand over the report to the line managers who then need to ensure that
there are interventions.'
63
Within the broader surveillance machine, line managers carry a huge
administrative burden. The burden of paperwork is described as
follows by a senior official in the province:
'I mean, in the Community Service Centre (i.e. police stations/charge desk)
we - essentially there's 22 registers in the CSC that we have to.. .(attend to)...
and duty bound to implement it. So it takes on average - and it does - it
is an issue, it takes on average for the shift commander, you would have
seen on your visits, his head is down. He looks down... initially for the first
part of his shift and then the last part of his shift. He looks down because
60 The Inspectorate is mandated to coordinate and manage the investigations of
complaints regarding service delivery.
61 The Commission also investigated the way in which the Performance Management
Chart operates in the SAPS - an issue which will not be discussed in this paper.
See in this regard the persuasive analysis of the strength and weaknesses provided
by A Faull 'Performance Management in Police Agencies'. A report written for the
Commission of Inquiry into allegations of police inefficiency in Khayelitsha, 10 May
2014.
62 S Jephta op cit (n59) at 6283.
63 S Jephta op cit (n59) at 6284.
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he is completing registers. Then before he leaves he has to hand over the
register.'
64
Record keeping looms large and cumbersome over the heads of all,
and coping strategies often try to circumvent the paper obligations.
Elaborate systems of inspection however do not make for compliance
in policing. In fact what the Commission engaged with was exactly
this issue - namely that the areas of non-compliance are well known
but that the system does not seem capable of changing practices or
addressing gaps. On this point General Jephta introduced a critical
issue - how best to align policing on the ground to the rules of policing
in books in a context where caseloads overwhelm the police.
Discipline turned out to be a delicate matter in a context of case
overload and low staff morale. As Colonel Johan Marais put it:
'I just want you to take into perspective if I have an individual that carries
150 murder dockets and he slips up with one or two dockets and now I have
to discipline him in such a manner that through the disciplining he might be
losing his next promotion that is around the corner then I am going to lose
the detective registers.'
65
Record-keeping line managers in turn find that the room for
improvement is extremely limited particularly if non-compliance itself
is a function of systemic challenges rather than human shortcomings.
As General Peter Jacobs put it, 'the officers, they feel sometimes they
are being inspected to death'."
A number of senior police were of the opinion that the failure to
record and complete administrative forms constituted a technical
failure but not necessarily an operational one. For Brigadier Dladla the
insistence on technical administrative compliance was no guarantee
for effectiveness at an operational level. General Jephta too drew a
distinction between administrative and operational command and
control. The reports of Leamy and Schooling, she argued, focused
on administrative command and not on operational command and
could therefore not come to the conclusion that policing on the ground
was inept. Colonel Reitz, the station commander at Lingelethu West,
conceded that 'on the administrative side things were not right' but
that policing took place, 'the operational side of policing, service to
the community, making arrests, doing what must be done and those
things, there was nothing wrong with it'.
67
Finally the conversation about the lack of fit between technical rules
and administrative regulations and actual operations on the ground
64 P Jacobs 'Oral Testimony to the Khayelitsha Commission' 28 February 2014 at 6072.
65 j Marais 'Oral Testimony to the Khayelitsha Commission' 19 February 2014 at 3881.
66 Jacobs op cit (n64) at 6105.
67 M Reitz 'Oral Testimony to the Khayelitsha Commission' 14 February 2014 at 3188.
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was important for understanding the consequences of a gap between
theory and practice. A gap between technical rules designed in the
air-conditioned office of Head Quarters and the messy operational
practices in the congested milieu of a high crime informal settlement
would breed cynicism. The gap may depress staff morale. The gap
may render well-designed systems of monitoring ineffective in that it
substitutes ends for means. It runs the risk of the rules on the books
belonging to a bureaucratic world order which presents an almost
'impossible' mandate.
7.6 We are human beings and often victims too
In the narrative of the complainant organisations ineptitude on
the part of the police inflicts secondary victimisation on victims of
crime. A double jeopardy is thus perpetrated. Not long into the police
submissions however it became evident that the police too stake claims
to being victims of state neglect, criminal predation and/or community
hostility. In doing so they challenge the one-sided depiction of police
personnel as perpetrators, pure and simple, of neglect and human
rights abuse of Khayelitsha's citizens. Realities on the ground, they
argue, are more complicated. Simplistic depictions have to make way
for a more nuanced understanding of the intractable role of the police.
In laying claim to a degree of victimhood they point to a workplace
within which they are overworked, underpaid, and often under-
appreciated. In their interactions with members of the community
they are often scapegoats for community frustrations which are related
to governmental ineptitude in other areas: housing, infrastructure and
so on. In their frontline position they have to take the blame for wider
systemic woes besetting the criminal justice system. Brigadier Dladla
articulated the point as follows:
'But unfortunately we chose the wrong job. We are only the whipping boys
as the SAPS. We were isolated as SAPS.'
68
Police witnesses emphasised that the locality was a dangerous one
- not only for members of the community but for police too. They
were subject to every day danger. Injury and death come their way.
They too are targets of criminal activity. On the streets they are often
'scared'. The dynamics of the place affect them adversely. As fellow
human beings, as members of communities, they not only have
responsibilities but also rights.
This portrayal of a dangerous job in an unruly place and of police
as victims of criminal action found articulation at the funeral of two
68 Z Dladla op cit (n35) at 3685.
SACJ • (2014) 3
policemen which took place in Nyanga in June 2014 which the writers
attended. Speaker upon speaker at the memorial service - an event
steeped in police subcultural dynamics - lamented the fact that so many
police die in the line of duty. The ceremony provided an opportunity
to reaffirm their status as fellow compatriots, as members of families
and of communities, as citizens of a constitutional democracy. In the
words of the Provincial Commission, Arno Lamoer:
'These are my members and I am responsible for them, to see their bodies
on a crime scene shocks and angers me. It makes me ask if anyone is safe in
this country, if people don't even respect the police.'
69
In an interesting way it is in the context of police deaths that the
police fraternity invokes the very notion of 'respect' and 'dignity'
which featured so strongly in community testimonies. The subtext
here seems to be that in this constitutional democracy police not only
have responsibilities. They too could lay claim to rights. They too
needed to be afforded respect and dignity.
In the testimony of Col Sonja Harri, Provincial Co-ordinator of the
Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS Unit),
the emotional toll for police working with gendered based violence
became evident.70 FCS Units were disbanded in the mid-2000s and
then reintroduced at cluster level in 2010. The performance of this
specialist unit in Khayelitsha had been poor. It was in fact described
as 'the worst performing unit' in the province. Again a range of factors
were considered in the quest for understanding this state of affairs:
the absence of a commanding officer, the exodus of skilled staff, an
inability to attract new staff to the unit, case overload and a huge
backlog. Inspections have found the unit to be dysfunctional with
poor docket management and poor investigations at the order of the
day.
Colonel Harri admitted to a wide range of problems besetting the
specialist unit and then broke down in front of the Commission.
71
Once she regained composure she spoke of the emotional stress in
doing this kind of work. Of how an attitude of negativity pervades
her colleagues and how desensitised they become in the course of
their duties. Given the harrowing nature of the work, finding officers
willing to work at the Unit has become extremely difficult. Within the
context of a hazardous occupation, the human beings inside those
69 A Lamoer quoted in S Fisher '5 cops killed in 5 days' Eyewitness News, 1 July 2014,
available at: http://ewn.co.za/201407O1/5-cops-dead-in-5-days, accessed on 20
August 2014.
70 S Harri 'Oral Testimony to the Khayelitsha Commission' 27 March 2014.
71 Harri op cit (n70)
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uniforms suffer post-traumatic stress on a scale not appreciated by
either outsiders or management.
7.7 It is lonely out there
There is widespread agreement that while public institutions such as
the police have a particularly important role when it comes to the
maintenance of order they cannot take responsibility for safety on
their own. The critical role of the informal sector in social ordering
has long been recognised in townships. For example, Tshehla's
investigation into social ordering in Khayelitsha in the early 2000s
captured the diversity in organisations involved in safety, security
and dispute resolution. 72 He concluded his review by stating that
the spheres of ordering had 'become both a competitive terrain and
increasingly uncertain' and at the time he advocated that some form of
state regulation was desirable.
73
The quest for cooperative alliances and for a regulatory framework
between formal and informal agencies of social ordering has been
part of policy debates over the past two decades. The deliberations
of the Commission provided proof of a widespread consensus about
the desirability of collaboration and cooperation between the public
police, the private sector and community-based structures. In poor
neighbourhoods unlike their more affluent counterparts however, the
onus falls on the state and neighbourhood structures to combine their
energies and resources.
What became clear from the discussions however, is just how
various factors conspire to undermine collaborative networks. Police
testimonies emphasised the wide range of challenges they confront in
their attempts at cooperating with 'force multipliers' such as informers,
reservists, neighbourhood watches and community volunteers. The
discussions served as a reminder of the fluidity of pact agreements
and how difficult they are to sustain over time.
In many of the conversations there were reflections on the decline in
police reservists and other volunteers associated with neighbourhood
watches. Changes in the rules of employment of police reservists with
much more stringent controls of selection and training clearly had a
detrimental impact. So too the discontinuation of a stipend resulted
in a rapid decline in volunteers organised under the neighbourhood
watch scheme. Furthermore shifts in party-political governance in the
province were identified as another complicating factor which drained
72 B Tshehla 'Non-state Justice in the Post-Apartheid South Africa' (2002) 6 African
Sociological Review 2 at 47-70.
73 B Tshehla op cit (n72).
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the spirit of voluntarism. As in the case of recruiting informers, a
long tradition of political stigmatisation of those who collaborate with
the police still casts its shadow over the prospect of alliances. The
difficulties associated with activating force multipliers and sustaining
networks over time meant that the prospect for policing as everyone's
business - within an agreed upon regulatory framework - was not
realised. On contrary, the police found themselves very much alone
'out there'. Alone in a territory perceived and experienced as needy,
hostile and dangerous.
8 Policing the urban periphery: a case of 'good enough'
policing?
The South African Police organisation constitutes a large and
cumbersome machine. Spread across nine provinces it has a total
complement of about 200 000 personnel. Over two decades it has
been guided by state-of-the-art policy frameworks (community
policing, sector policing, intelligence-led policing, victim orientated
policing). The bureaucratic infrastructure is well developed by African
standards. The architecture of this large and rational bureaucratic
machine is superimposed on a police system on the ground which
struggles to make headway against high volumes of crime, endemic
case overload, uneven levels of skills and pockets of corruption and
considerable demoralisation.
From the deliberations of the Commission, the Janus-faced nature
of the police institution and the society within which it operates
becomes clear: the contradictory impulses of an institution that is both
modern and primitive, and a social locality that is at once orderly and
anarchic. We have described key features of an organisation which
perceives itself to be under siege, and of a community which bears
the imprint of deep inequalities and social disorganisation. Assessed
from the vantage point of external environmental challenges and
internal institutional limitations, what indeed could and should police
focus their energies on in urban localities such as Khayelitsha? For
inspiration and perhaps consolation we turn to the notion of 'good
enough' policing as developed by Ben Bowling in an article published
in 2007.
74
In a spirit of realism Bowling advises that we should abandon the
pursuit of 'unachievable maxima' ie of 'perfect policing' characterised
by both fairness and effectiveness. In developing his argument the
author draws on observations from a developed part of the world
the United Kingdom. In developing contexts characterised by much
74 B Bowling op cit (n19).
Policing of an urban periphery: The case of Khayelitsha
deeper forms of social inequality the tension between fairness and
effectiveness would be much more pronounced. Bowling warns
'equality of outcome in policing however desirable, is likely to be
unattainable'. 75 Instead it may be much more realistic to settle for 'good
enough' policing, recognising that at any particular point in time there
are difficult choices to be made about the roles of the police which
need to be prioritised.
'We ask a lot of the police, and this fact underlines the folly in the pursuit
of maximal effectiveness and maximal fairness. We need to be thinking
about what is "effective enough" and "fair enough", recognizing that this may
differ from community to community... Policing never has and never will be
perfect. The task ahead is to ensure that it is good enough.'
76
Bowling's advice to opt for 'good enough policing' is apt given the state
of affairs which define urban townships as peripheral spaces crippled
by a lag in development and various social ailments including high
rates of predatory crime. In such contexts the demand for security is
insatiable and the police's role in responding to that demand is always
limited.
The deliberations of the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry yield
considerable detail and nuance relevant to any strategic assessment
of how best limited resources can be deployed to enhance the safety
of the poor. Strategic assessments of this nature will have to consider
the particular roles the police could (or should) be prioritising in any
given locality and at any particular point in time.
77
However, even the more realistic vision of 'good enough' policing
will be sabotaged if police stations in informal settlements continue
to be administered as second class stations - a modern version so to
speak of the earlier punishment stations. The police narratives about
the place (Khayelitsha), the institution (the SAPS), and the job (of
policing) - which the Khayelitsha Commission succeeded in making
public - deserve to be understood if the quest for more safety in urban
peripheries is to be realised.
75 B Bowling op cit (n19) at 29.
76 B Bowling op cit (n19) at 30.
77 Jonny Steinberg's recent engagement with political developments in post-Apartheid
state formation and the usurpation of police power for political ends makes for
compelling reading. J Steinberg 'Policing, State Power and the Transition from
Apartheid to Democracy: A new perspective', (2014) 113 African Ajfairs (451), at
173 -191.
